The Bombe machine was a key device in the cryptanalysis of the ciphers created by the machine system widely employed by the Axis powers during the Second World WarEnigma. The Bombe machine was initially designed Britain by scientists in primary cryptanalysis agency, the Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park. The machines were then mass produced by the British Tabulating Machine Company in Britain, and by the National Cash Register Company in the United States of America. The design, development and mass production of the machine was a fraught process dependent on support from scientists and bureaucrats within the agency, but more importantly the agency was only moved to mechanise, and subsequently professionalise, this key function in its operations when met with a series of major crises. The result was an unplanned ad hoc process of designing, building and operating the machines. This was representative of the wider process of mechanisation within Bletchley Park, one of the most important and renowned technological centres to emerge in Britain during the Second World War.
whole, as a key driving force of mechanisation and bureaucratic professionalisation within Britain's structures of governance, citing Bletchley Park as an example.
4 This article builds on that interpretation, suggesting that while technocratic specialists within Bletchley Park facilitated mechanisation, the agency was partly, in fact, resistant to changing the existing structures and sometimes hostile to new technologies, and that mechanisation owed as much to wartime tests 5 and opportunities as it did to the professionalising influence of scientists. The agency can be broadly, though as will be shown there was considerable overlap, split into two different camps: those cryptanalysts from an earlier generation, typically academics drawn from the arts faculties who approached the problem of codebreaking through an examination of language and linguistics; and a later generation of mathematicians, scientists and managers who were arguably more open to new techniques, including mechanisation.
Specifically, change only occurred in response to overwhelming external and internal logistical and political pressures. The result was that mechanisation and professionalisation occurred in a haphazard and ad hoc fashion, because the agency was typically resistant to and, given the weight and rapid emergence of problems, incapable of War: war, peace and social change, 1900 -1967 (London, 1968 .
Britain in the Century of Total
long-term planning. In order to illustrate this unplanned and ad hoc process of institutional evolution, this article will draw upon the development of the Bombe. The
Bombe machines were complex pieces of apparatus designed to aid in the cryptanalysis of the famous Enigma cipher system.
Unsurprisingly, given the significance of wartime cryptanalysis to Allied prosecution of the war, there has been significant study of the work of GC&CS. The majority of this literature has been dedicated to the question of what influence Allied signals intelligence had upon the outcome of the Second World War. This trend was set by the very first full length English language book to be written on the subject; the memoir of the intelligence officer F. W. Winterbotham. 6 Subsequent memoirs and histories largely continued with the same focus. 7 It was not until the publication of the memoir of the cryptanalyst Gordon
Welchman in 1986, that some of the questions regarding the technical methods employed to break Axis ciphers began to be addressed. Interestingly, Welchman, who was also a senior manager at Bletchley Park, also gave some insight into the evolving bureaucracy at Bletchley Park and how the structure of the agency facilitated the work of the cryptanalysts. Importantly, Welchman also provided his recollections of the construction 6
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of the Bombe machines. Relatively recent studies of Bletchley Park and GC&CS have expanded our understanding of the agencies structures, 8 and the technical specifications of its machines, 9 but very little has been said regarding the actual process of constructing the machines, those who advocated building them, and the extent to which opposition impeded and delayed construction. No study has attempted to map the influence of social and cultural developments within the agency and the process of mechanisation by the agency. Filling this gap yields an interesting story in of itself, but more importantly it also serves as a vehicle to test various theses within the field of wartime science and technology, which most certainly have considered the influence of wider society and culture in the development of technology.
Relatively recent work regarding the attitude of the British state towards scientific and technological development in wartime has produced interesting, if conflicting studies.
David Edgerton, for instance, has argued that the British state was militant, scientific and technocratic, and that the importance of mechanised warfare and industry was encouraged from the highest levels of government. For instance, Edgerton argues that the Civil Service, and government, rather than being dominated by men with an education in the classics, who did not understand science, and who were resistant to new technology, in fact, contained a powerful core of scientifically educated technocrats. Moreover, Edgerton argues that the British state was, in fact, highly technologically advanced by the standards of the day, militaristic, and far better prepared for war than often assumed. Moreover, the centrality of science and technology was championed from the highest levels of Britain's wartime government.
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Thus, Edgerton writes, "Wartime Britain saw a quite extraordinary cult of invention and inventor, whose high priest was the Prime Minister himself. Jon Agar, in his history of the British Civil Service, argues that the government is like a machine. 14 That the manner in which the government, and Civil Service departments, operate employ machine-like processes, and that senior members of the Civil Service, deliberately characterised the bureaucracy of state in these terms. The purpose being to generate trust in the Civil Service; machines are impartial, efficient, and, of course, "mechanical" in their operation. Furthermore, the "government machine" also operated a policy of the physical, as opposed to metaphorical, mechanisation of its processes during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Thus the Civil Service, already operating like a machine and encouraging that view of itself, began the process of mechanising its work.
This process of mechanisation, Agar argues, was spearheaded by an increasingly influential middle-ranking tier of technocratic specialists within the Civil Service and, in particular, the Treasury. This technocratic group was comprised of scientific specialists who persuaded their more senior colleagues, the Civil Service mandarins often with an education in the classics as opposed to the sciences, to adopt their policy of mechanisation, which the mandarins agreed to on the basis that it would make work more efficient and less costly. Thus, the mechanisation of government was directed and driven from within, by a group of powerful technologically minded specialists. professionalising impact of mathematicians had not occurred during the interwar years?
Of course, number of mathematicians employed by GC&CS increased rapidly during the war, and particular mathematicians, like Alan Turing and Gordon Welchman both of whom played a major role in the development of the Bombe machine, were recruited in 1939. It is undeniable that both men played a major role in facilitating and championing the mechanisation of GC&CS; however, it is clear that the arrival of scientists alone could not facilitate mechanisation which did not occur until wartime.
The organization theorist Christopher Grey, rather than proposing a linear development within GC&CS, highlights the importance of the type of working being conducted and the autonomy of workers. Thus, while areas of work deemed to be "low skilled", such as machine operation, took on the characteristics outlined by Agar, "highly skilled" sections, such as that of cryptanalysts and translators retained many of the characteristics of collegiate system of the pre-war agency. Grey presents an image of GC&CS's different sections, run on different principles as described above, being "twisted together" over the course of the war. 18 Grey's model is useful as it highlights the often ad hoc of GC&CS's growth, professional and mechanical in some areas of its work, but unorthodox, unregimented and, perhaps, even anarchic in others particularly those areas deemed to require leeway to lubricate the wheels of creative and intellectual expertise. As we shall Alistair Denniston to C. E. D. Peters, 26 April, 1932, HW 72/9, TNA. see, this freedom and attitude within GC&CS was provided in abundance to GC&CS's technical experts and had a considerable impact upon the development of the Bombe machine and later adapted models. However, Grey's model is incomplete and applies primarily to the development of GC&CS's organisational structure. The impact of these developments on, or even whether they apply at all to, the process of mechanisation within GC&CS is all but omitted. Thus, while Grey's model is useful in understanding GC&CS's overall organisational development, further thought is needed in understanding the process of cryptanalytic mechanisation during the war. British Dreams, British Realities, 1945 -1950 (London, 1995 . For other examples, see Martin J. Weiner, English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 1850 -1980 (Cambridge, 1981 ; Michael Dintenfass, The Decline of Industrial Britain: 1870 -1980 (London, 1992 Twentieth Century British History, 8, no. 2 (1997), 222-238; David Edgerton, Warfare State: Britain, 1920 -1970 (Cambridge, 2005 .
Technological solutions to complex problems, such as the Bombe machine as a response to mechanised cryptography, were certainly embraced by the British government and, as this article will show, substantial funding and manpower was provided to the project of mechanising cryptanalysis.
Clearly then, the 'declinist' thesis has only limited utility in examining the construction of the Bombe machines; not only was GC&CS, as an agency, able to draw upon significant resources and support from the British state, but it was able to channel those resources into the development of novel technologies designed by professional scientists. However, it is certainly the case that the senior figures within GC&CS, who were drawn from an 'old guard' of GC&CS recruit and often reflected the educational background of Barnett's caricature civil servant, were often the most apathetic when it came to adopting new methods and technologies. As a result, the explanation that because Britain was a technocratic militant state, it naturally followed that its scientific military institutions would be at the forefront of mechanisation requires further nuance. Meanwhile, Agar's conclusion that mechanisation occurred because of the arrival of scientific mechanisers, with a technocratic ideology, also fails to fully encapsulate the process of mechanisation. Rather than embracing technocratic solutions, such as the Bombe machine, Bletchley Park's senior staff members, were, in fact, typically indifferent and prone to technological inertia; building machines, upgrading them, and efficiently utilising them, only when existing measures were stretched to breaking point.
Instead, the agency invariably took the line of least resistance, adopting mechanisation only when all else failed, resulting in a distinctly ad hoc and unplanned process of mechanisation, achieved only in fits and starts, which only occurred at moments of major institutional stress brought about by the wider pressures of war.
To understand the process of mechanisation at Bletchley Park, it is necessary to examine how the GC&CS's senior staff and government sponsors were forced to reconsider their attitudes towards technology and the role of machines, and how wartime developments created opportunities for Bletchley's scientists . The Enigma machine resembled a typewriter. The purpose of the machine was to allow an operator to press a key on the machines keyboard and generate a different letter seemingly at random. The machine worked by creating an electrical signal, each time a key was depressed, which would light a corresponding letter on a lamp board located above the keyboard. Between the keys and the lamps, lay a series of three rotors, each with 26 potential positions representing letters of the alphabet, and each rotor position creating a different electrical pathway. The machine also included a reflector, so once the electrical signal had passed through the machine, it would be returned back through the rotors and thus through an entirely different pathway. The German military Enigma machines also included a Steckerverbindungen, a plug board, allowing the operator to manually plug a letter to a different corresponding lamp, adding an extra layer of complexity. 27 Moreover, each time a key was depressed one or more rotors would move forward a position, thus the same key could be depressed multiple times and each occasion lighting a different corresponding letter. Unless the recipient of a message knew the precise configuration of the machine, or "key", which had generated the message all the reader would have was a meaningless series of letters.
For its day, the machine offered considerable advantages. It was easily mass-produced, it was relatively small and light making it portable, and it offered a high degree of security.
To make matters more complex, it was also relatively easily modified, and various branches of the German state adopted their own customised version or variant of the Enigma system. Thus, these variants of Enigma were typically unique to the agency which had adopted them, heavily upgraded and generally deemed by the agencies in question to be unbreakable 28 -according to the internal history of GC&CS commissioned at the end of the war, this was also a view shared by Britain's cryptanalysts in during the would require a similar mechanical revolution in the profession of cryptanalysis.
The British were not alone in that assessment, the Polish Cipher Bureau had come to the same conclusion and by 1938 had developed a mechanical device they called the Bomba.
With this device the Poles enjoyed some success against some of the German military Enigma systems at least until July 1939 when the Germans upgraded their systems.
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However, aside from speculation, it was not until the British learned of the Polish successes that serious consideration was given to mechanical aids in tacking the Enigma problem. Indeed, comparatively little consideration had been given to Enigma at all up until that point. In retrospect, given that the Enigma system had been adopted by elements of the German military as early as 1926 and by the mid-1930s was becoming increasingly ubiquitous it is surprising that GC&CS did not employ its resources on the problem until the late 1930s.
As Birch noted, "it was not until May 1938 that, in naval Section GC&CS, a German subsection, consisting of one officer and one lady clerk, neither of them a cryptanalyst, was set up to analyse the traffic." 32 The cause of this limited attention to the problem was two-fold, firstly GC&CS was preoccupied with the problems posed by Imperial Japan and fascist Italy, and secondly because the Enigma system was advanced beyond the capabilities of GC&CS to tackle at that time.
33 Such was the pessimism within GC&CS, particularly when it came to the most challenging variant of the German Enigma systems, that of the German Navy, was widely believed to be unbreakable. There were only two individuals who took exception to this otherwise ubiquitous belief; these were Frank Birch and Alan Turing. According to the cryptanalyst Hugh Alexander, latterly the commander of Hut 8, the GC&CS section tasked with the campaign against the ciphers employed by the German Navy, the reasons they differed from the rest of GC&CS were two-fold.
Birch thought it could be broken because it had to be broken and Turing thought it could be broken because it would be so interesting to break it. Whether or not these reasons were logically satisfactory they imbued those who held them with a determination that the problem should be solved and it is to the pertinacity and June 2013).
36
of three rows of 36 rotating drums, the drums replicating the function of an Enigma machine. These drums, as well as vast quantities of internal wiring, were housed in a large bronze cabinet over six feet in height, seven feet in width and two feet in depth.
Part of the problem with the development of such technologies was that the machines were extremely expensive by the standard of the day. For instance, the project to design and development of the Bombe machines was granted a budget of £100,000. 37 This led to considerable opposition from within the agency for the design and construction of the machines. As Mahon explained,
Unfortunately the Bombe was an expensive apparatus and it was far from certain that it would work or, even if the Bombe itself worked, that it would enable us to break Enigma. Its original production, and above all the acceptance of a scheme for large scale production, was the subject of long and bitter battles and Hut 8, and of course, Hut 6, owe very much to Commander Travis and to a lesser extent to Mr. Birch, for the energy and courage with which they sponsored its production.
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Of course, neither Birch nor Travis were technocratic expert mechanisers. Both of them were products of an earlier cryptanalytic era, the First World War with its emphasis on classics and language as opposed to mathematics and engineering, and resultantly neither were trained mathematicians and scientists. As noted, Birch was an historian by trade, while Travis had been recruited into cryptanalytic work from the ranks of Royal Navy.
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They looked to mechanical solutions to the Enigma problem, as Alexander noted of Birch, "because it had to be broken". The issue was one of necessity dictated by the escalating problems posed by the war, primarily that Britain's chief opposing power, Nazi
Germany, had adopted a machine cipher system that could not be quickly broken without mechanical aids.
The arrival of mechanical solutions, to speed up the process of cryptanalysis, in 1940
heralded a new chapter in British cryptanalysis, and the almost lackadaisical attitude towards the problems posed by machine ciphers had come to a definite end. The evolution in British cryptanalysis heralded by the development of these machines, was certainly quickly appreciated by the cryptanalysts. The arrival of the prototype in April 1940 was followed, in August, by an improved model. By the summer of 1941, the Bombes were deemed to have proven their worth and production had begun in earnest. The cost of each individual machine, after the initial substantial cost to design and build the prototype machines was also relatively high. In
December 1940, when GC&CS contacted BTM regarding placing an order for a further 12 machines, BTM quoted a base figure of £7,500 per machine. 47 Given that the annual salary of a cryptanalyst, of the Civil Service rank of Junior Assistant, was between £260
and £400, the cost of 12 machines was much as the annual cost of 225 cryptanalysts. Given that the first Bombe machine was delivered to Bletchley Park around two years previously, and that the early Bombe period in Enigma cryptanalysis was problematic due to limited numbers of machines, the failure of the agency to adopt a system in which to efficiently organise Bombe time is remarkable. Despite the severity of these problems, the agency was willing to ignore them, without instituting administrative measures, for an exceptionally lengthy period of time. So why, after two years, did the agency determine to institute a change at that point? The internal histories of GC&CS provide few answers.
Alexander notes that "sudden demands" for machine time by Hut 8 would "seriously disrupt" the work of its sister Enigma cryptanalysis section, Hut 6. Firstly, it therefore seems reasonable to speculate that, despite the growing number of Bombe machines, the impact of these disruptions had increased in number and intensity. Secondly, the introduction of this measure was at least partially a product of the wider administrative revolution within the agency -the February 1942 reorganisation of GC&CS.
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There is dispute among the internal histories of GC&CS precisely when this arrangement took shape, Alexander suggests that the system was adopted in the spring summer period of 1942, while Birch states that it was adopted in early 1942. Alexander, ***
The reorganisation of GC&CS was prompted by considerable dissatisfaction both within GC&CS and from its client ministries with the organisational apparatus within GC&CS -of which the failure to produce an adequate system for distributing Bombe time was symptomatic. The consistent bottle-necks within key GC&CS processes, such as Bombe allocation, created by an increasing volume of intercepted wireless traffic and the failure of the agency to acquire sufficient materiel and workers, to match these increases made it increasingly difficult for the agency to produce enough material to satisfy its customers. but was a poor manager, were replaced and new administrative systems, such as the "Bombe control" committee, were established. However, as Christopher Grey notes, this solution to the problem of Bombe time was far from guaranteed to be a success and, importantly, that the various parties involved had to come up with their "own solution" -highlighting the ad hoc nature of the solution. 54 In the end it was successful, in part, Grey argues, because the committee was comprised by individuals who were in many cases already friends and had been so since before the war. Therefore, inter-service rivalry, which had exacerbated the problem in the first place, was not as prominent within the committee as it might have been and was elsewhere at Bletchley Park. produced one of the most bitter and protracted disputes to erupt among GC&CS and its contractors, and is worth describing in some detail.
As it was, some tentative research was already being conducted by the physicist C.E. commutator assembly, which incorporated a fourth wheel to the Bombe machine, and a vacuum tube in place of the old electromagnetic relays used by the old machine -this plug-in upgrade to the Bombe was dubbed Cobra. 64 Meanwhile, Harold "Doc" Keen, the lead engineer working on the construction of Bombe machines at BTM, began designing his own four wheel Bombe machine in February 1942 and completed designs by the following month -dubbed Mammoth. This presented GC&CS with a dilemma; the Cobra system, while concluded to be problematic in a number of respects, it presented the swiftest solution to the problem posed by the M4. Mammoth, on the other hand, promised to be a more flexible machine that could be adapted to a wider variety of problems.
GC&CS chose to invest efforts primarily into the Cobra system while also continuing to develop Mammoth as a "second bow" that could be applied to more difficult problems. It was initially decided to build 34 Cobras and only six Mammoths.
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However, Cobra development was fraught with problems. Gordon Welchman, who designed an important early improvement to the Bombe machines in 1940, complained that Wynn-Williams was, badly let down by his engineering advisers and the workshop in which the first prototype Cobra was built. He was led to suppose that the sensing was key to the 64 For a detailed description of the Corbra Bombe, see: David Whitehead, 'Cobra and Other
Bombes ' Cryptologia, 20, no. 4 (1996): 289-307. 65 problem, whereas all subsequent (and previous) experience has shown that sensing is comparatively trivial, whereas the real difficulty was mechanical.
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In other words, the engineers falsely concluded that the problem with Cobra was in its vacuum tube sensors when the real problem lay with the mechanical commutator assembly. Tommy Flowers, an engineer from the General Post Office (GPO), who would later go onto lead the team which would design and build Bletchley Park's other towering technological achievement, Colossus computer, was brought into build the sensing unit.
However, he went about redesigning the unit, causing friction with Wynn-Williams who suggested that Flower's design was problematic in several different areas. Welchman, the head of GC&CS's mechanisation programme, was brought in to mediate, but concluded that he lacked the technical expertise to come to a definitive conclusion without subjecting the prototypes to further experimentation.
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Meanwhile, the Mammoth Machines were developing well, and by October the first of the machines had been constructed and began preliminary testing. This period of testing was aimed at discovering, and solving, problems in the design and manufacture before other machines underwent production. This early model was predicted to be able to complete a Bombe run in 22 minutes. At that time it was hoped that the vacuum tube, or valve, based sensor would be applicable to Keens machine, replacing the relays sensor and reducing the time it would take to complete a run to 13 minutes. 68 However, Keen hoped to be able to produce a new relay sensor which was capable of achieving the same speeds projected for the valve sensor and set about attempting to design and construct that upgrade.
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As noted, at that time, GC&CS was considering the possibility of mixing and matching the various components and machines undergoing design and production in the hope of creating an optimum machine, which they codenamed Centaur. The development of the Cobra Bombes continued, but remained problematic. 70 By October, like Mammoth, a prototype had been built but had failed and projections suggested that a working prototype might not be available for a further eight weeks. 71 Therefore, neither Flowers'
nor Wynn-William's sensor was able to be adequately tested because of continued problems with the mechanical fourth wheel. The situation rapidly changed in December 1942 when Bletchley's cryptanalysts, using the old three-wheel Bombe machines, were able to make a break into M4. This altered the situation entirely; no longer did GC&CS need to rush a few machines into production as soon as possible. Instead, they could afford to take longer and fine tune the designs to produce better machines in quantity rather than build a few flawed machines quickly. At that stage, Welchman concluded that it would be better to focus on the BTM Mammoth machine, which was more adaptable.
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However, Flowers and Radley still hoped to be able to test their sensor. A proposal was made to allow Flowers and his team to test his sensor on one of the new four-wheel Bombes developed by BTM. However, the obvious objection to that was that it would consume valuable time experimenting with the new machines to find problems that would need to be ironed out of future machines, thus holding up production. Meanwhile, the problems with the Cobra still had yet to be resolved, leaving Flowers in the frustrating position of having a prototype sensor requiring testing, but no four-wheel unit upon which to perform those tests. Fully appraised of the problems Bletchley Park was having with the German naval Enigma system, combined with the heavy losses British and American shipping suffered at the hands of the U-Boats, US officials were determined to increase Bombe production.
After some negotiation regarding the number of machines the US would build, US engineers began the process of designing their own prototype high-speed machine to tackle the four rotor problem. The US navy machine was a little different from its primary Relationship, 1940 -1946 (Novato: CA, 1992 , 122.
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of seconds. Furthermore, the British cryptanalysts were impressed with the machine which was deemed to be an improvement on British models.
88
Moreover, the US manufacturing industry was capable of a quality and speed of work which was beyond the resources of British manufacturers. Initial plans were drawn up in September 1942 and revised plans produced in January 1943, and by May 1st prototypes had been built. The design and production of the machines was awarded to the American National Cash Register Co. in Dayton, Ohio. The company was able to produce machines extremely quickly at a rate of two a week by the autumn of 1943. Obviously, this was far beyond the capacity of BTM. In the end, US Bombe production was limited to around 125 machines. 89 Initially, based on a not altogether rounded view of the problem posed by
The policy of the British and American cryptanalysts was that the US contribution towards German Naval traffic was that the US should be a junior partner. This would allow the US to place the weight of its assets behind the problem posed by Japanese traffic, while allowing British experience and expertise, which was two years ahead, took the lead. As Hugh Alexander described it,
In the cryptographic field they [OP. 20 G] adopted from the beginning the clearly correct policy of supplementing our work rather than of attempting to cover the whole field themselves. With this end in view they set up a thoroughly efficient and businesslike organization but did not put in it their best cryptographers. They were taking the lead in Japanese cryptography in which there was an immense field to cover and it would have been wasteful to have put their outstanding technical experts on to the Enigma in which the main problems had been solved and in which we had several years start. Moreover they only intercepted a comparatively small amount of German traffic which was another severe handicap. specialised machinery has only just been adequate for the problems. Small improvements in the enemy's machine sand methods could and may yet defeat us.
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The truth of all of these assertions is borne out by an examination of GC&CS's successes and failures in the first half of the war. GC&CS was slow to get to grips with the Enigma problem, slower still to investigate mechanical solutions to the problem and, as
Welchman observed, found it very difficult to mass produce those mechanical solutions.
Considerable pressures were placed on the contractors GC&CS commissioned to build the machines, often because GC&CS was unsure regarding the direction it wished to pursue. A key example of both elements of Welchman's critique, the fragility of GC&CS's methods to alterations in Axis cipher machines and the mishandling of production, can be observed in the introduction of an Enigma system with a fourth-wheel. Of course, the sour period resulting from GC&CS's attempts to deal with the problem posed by the addition of a fourth wheel to the Naval Enigma, was only one in a catalogue of problems revolving around the development and production of the Bombe machine. It must be recalled that, as we have seen, the agency met the prospect of designing and building a machine to address a cryptanalytic problem with considerable apprehension. It was only the intervention of individual like Frank Birch, an historian without a technocratic or scientific background, and Alan Turing, a theoretical mathematician and logician, that led to investigation into the Naval Enigma problem and championed investment in mechanical solutions. However, still more importantly Birch championed the problem because he understood the gravity of the problem in the face of war with
Germany. Yet even once Bombe production was at last underway little thought and planning had been made to actually accommodate the machines and the vast number of personnel necessary to operate them. This resulted in the wholesale expansion of GC&CS beyond the gates of Bletchley Park. Furthermore, despite constant issues regarding time sharing between various sections of the agency, for use of the machines, no formal plan or agreement had been made to solve this problem until two years after the delivery of the first machine. The failure of the agency, and those in command of its mechanisation programme, to adequately plan how their new machines would be used is indicative of the wider attitude of the agency. The Bombe machines were built to solve a crisis, and resolution of the problems surrounding their use were only resolved in the face of new crises.
Study of Bombe development also reveals much about the role of scientific expertise in GC&CS. It is interesting that the two key figures in obtaining the Bombe project the "green light" were Frank Birch and Edward Travis. These two individuals, both products of GC&CS's collegiate era were not scientists, expert mechanisers or technocrats, but nevertheless they played an important role in identifying and arguing the case for mechanisation. Therefore, the agency's scientists, like Turing and Welchman, designed the machines but the battle in the board room for the project was championed by two of the agency's most senior figures, including its second-in-command. It is clear therefore, that mechanisation was pushed for by both scientists but also senior management within the agency. However, importantly, this key support was available only in times of crisis.
This suggests that while pressure from scientists and support from the highest levels were essential, important factors emphasised by Agar and Edgerton respectively, perhaps the most important factor in mechanisation was a constant stream of crises to force the agency into action.
To conclude, the mechanisation of Bletchley Park, and the difficulties discovered in the design and production of the Bombe machine, represents an excellent example of the wider development of GC&CS during wartime. The agency set about mechanising and professionalising a number of its processes as a means of solving problems and widening bottlenecks which restricted its capacity to successfully fulfil its mandate. It did not mechanise these process as part of a wider attempt to improve efficiency, instead mechanisation was characterised by incremental changes to GC&CS's infrastructure and operations as new problems were identified and solutions developed. Clearly, successful long term planning was remarkably difficult and instead there were a series of ad hoc solutions to newly emergent problems. In the internal history of GC&CS written after the war, Frank Birch described the agency as a whole in a manner which is entirely reflected in its attempt to build the Bombe machines: GC&CS was like "a rudderless vessel buffeted about at the mercy of every wave of circumstance." 94 94
